Abstract
Introduction
Information flow security is concerned with the ability of agents in a system to make deductions about the activity of others, or to cause information to flow to other agents. Since the seminal work of Goguen and Meseguer [8] , which introduced the notion of noninterference in a deterministic state machine model, a significant body of literature has developed on this topic, dealing with how noninterference should be defined in nondeterministic state machines [14, 3] and in richer semantic models such as the process algebras CCS [6] and CSP [20, 15] . Until recently, however, most work in this area confined itself to asynchronous models of computation, assuming that agents do not have access to a system clock, which is too strong in many applications.
Notably, this is the case in the original motivation for the notion of noninterference, operating systems separation kernels [16, 17, 18] . The function of this class of software system is to separate security domains in order to prevent * Work of the first author supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant. The first author thanks the Courant Institute, New York University and the Computer science Department, Stanford University for their hospitality in hosting a sabbatical visit during which this work was conducted. National ICT Australia is funded through the Australian Government's Backing Australia's Ability initiative, in part through the Australian Research Council.
information flow and clashes of shared resource usage. In particular, in a uni-processor system this involves scheduling the activity of the agents in the system. In the presence of scheduling, many of the assumptions of the asynchronous systems models used in the literature break down. For example, a common assumption is that the system is "input enabled" in the sense that each action may be performed at any state. This is patently not the case in the presence of scheduling, which enables one agent's actions while simultaneously disabling the actions of others. Similarly, knowledge of the schedule may permit Low to deduce the number of actions that High has taken, whereas the asynchronous definitions of security would classify this as insecure. A correct treatment of systems such as separation kernels therefore requires different definitions of security.
In this paper, we undertake a study of the impact of schedulers on some of the asynchronous definitions of security from the literature. We ask how these definitions should be modified, and study the relationships between the revised definitions. One question of particular concern is the extent to which these definitions are sensitive to how the scheduler is implemented. Intuitively, the function of a scheduler is only to make decisions as to when each agent in the system should be enabled. Schedulers may be nondeterministic, and the nondeterminism may be resolved early (e.g., by flipping a set of coins before their outcome is needed) or late (e.g., by flipping coins only at decision points). However, as the private state of the scheduler should be invisible to the agents in the system (although they may know the scheduler being used), such implementation details should not affect the security of the system. Independence of scheduler implementation also gives desirable flexibility to the implementer of the scheduler. We show that modified versions of trace-based definitions of security are independent of the scheduler implementation, but this is not the case for the definitions motivated by McCullough's notion of restrictiveness [13, 14] (which is also closely related to one of Focardi and Gorrieri's bisimulation based definitions of security [6] ). We also consider a notion of security that requires a system to be secure with respect to all schedulers in cer-tain classes of schedulers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we sketch a simple example where information flow properties are sensitive to time and scheduling. In Section 3 we introduce the semantic framework within which we work, a type of labelled transition system with observations. Section 4 defines schedulers and their representation within this model. Section 5 deals with trace-based definitions of security for systems with schedulers. Section 6 considers bisimulation-based definitions, where independence of the scheduler implementation becomes a non-trivial issue. Section 7 deals with a generalization of scheduler implementation independence -the security of systems for all schedulers in certain classes. Section 8 discusses related work in the area of noninterference with time and/or scheduling, and Section 9 concludes and proposes future directions.
A Motivating Example
H L Sys Buffer
Figure 1. Motivating Example
Suppose we have the following scenario, illustrated in Fig. 2 . Two processes H and L are controlled by an operating system Sys that is responsible for communicating messages to the network as well as scheduling the activity of the two processes. (For a formal definition of H, L and S ys we refer to Section 3) A process may request that a message be sent by writing it into a buffer. The buffer is shared between H,L and the system itself, and has a capacity of at most one message.
The system is prompt to respond to requests from H and L: if there is a message from one of these processes in the buffer when the system regains control, it immediately dispatches the message and clears the buffer. However, the system makes greedy use of the buffer for its own purposes: whenever there is no message in the buffer, it places its own data in the buffer, which it may keep there for any period of time that it chooses. To counteract this, processes are allowed to preempt the system's use of the buffer. This is done in a two-step process: when the process attempts to write to the buffer and it contains Sys data, the buffer is first emptied and the process is sent a "retry" message. If it then re-attempts its write to the buffer while it is clear, the write will be successful. On the other hand, when H or L tries to write a message to the buffer and it already contains a message from either process, its request is rejected and a "full" message returned.
In this example the scheduler implemented in the system is important to information flow security analysis. Let us assume that the security policy allows information only flow from L to H but not from H to L. Then, assuming the private state of the buffer is invisible to L, we have the following observations.
• If the scheduler is a round-robin HLS ysHLS ys. . . , then L can only send a message when H skips. Each time H fills the buffer, L's message will be rejected with a "full" message in that round. L will therefore know that there is an H message in the buffer. Intuitively, this means that the system is insecure.
• If the scheduler separates H and L by HHS ysS ysS ysLLS ysS ysS ys . . ., then, intuitively, the system is secure, since the system is guaranteed to transmit any message H sends, clearing the buffer. It will then greedily grab the buffer and may or may not release it, but the system will be in a state uncorrelated with H activity when L is scheduled. Furthermore, each agent is guaranteed to have one message sent to the outside each time it is scheduled, by applying a first action to empty the buffer whenever the buffer is occupied by S ys. Interestingly, the greediness of the system means that if we use only two S ys steps between H and L then if L tries to send a message and it is accepted then H must have not sent a message (else the buffer would contain S ys data). This version is insecure.
A Discrete-Time System Model
We take as the basic semantic model an enrichment of the well-established labelled transition system semantics for process algebra, adding to it a notion of observation on states. This provides a framework that seems better able to capture the fact that in synchronous systems, agents may observe state changes even when not participating in an action. It could be further enriched, e.g., by allowing simultaneous actions, but we do not pursue this since we are specifically interested in systems subject to a scheduler.
A signature is a tuple (A, D, d om) consisting of a set of actions A, a set of domains (or agents) D and a function d om : A → D associating a domain with each action. We define a state-observed labelled transition system (SOLTS) for such a signature to be a tuple of the form S, S 0 , →, O, obs where
• S is a set of states (with elements denoted by s, t, t 1 , etc.),
• S 0 ⊆ S represents the set of initial states,
• O is a set of observations, 
This corresponds to the lock-step execution of the two systems with synchronisation on actions.
Like most of the literature, we confine our attention to systems with two security domains High (H) and Low (L) and the security policy L ≤ H, which prohibits information flow from H to L. However, in order to deal with scheduling and passage of time, it is convenient to include a third agent Sys that may act when both H and L are waiting. The agent Sys can be understood as corresponding to the scheduler activity as well as system internal actions. For the remainder of this paper, we let D = {H, L, Sys}. For u ∈ D we define A u = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = u}, and assume that A Sys = {τ }. (The effect of Sys actions may be nondeterministic, but we assume that there is not a need to distinguish specific Sys events. Whereas A H and A L can be thought of as representing inputs provided by the agents, Sys provides no inputs, but only represents the automatic evolution of the state over time.) Write M for the set of all input-enabled SOLTS with D = {H, L, Sys} and A Sys = {τ }, and refer to these systems as machines. In addition, we assume that actions take unit time and that time continues to flow, so that agents cannot halt the system by failing to act when scheduled. If failure to act is a possibility in an application, it can be accommodated by including a "null" action for each agent, after which the scheduler may schedule another agent.
Schedulers
Machines can be given an asynchronous semantics, but in this paper we will study a semantics in which machines execute under the control of a scheduler, which selects an agent at each moment of time. Our definition of scheduler differs from others in the literature (such as that of [22] ) in that a scheduler only partially resolves the system's nondeterminism. We give an agent free will to choose which action to perform when it is scheduled.
Formally, a scheduler is a function σ : A * → P(D). Intuitively, given a history of actions α ∈ A * , one of the agents in the set σ(α) will be scheduled next. Compatibility of a finite sequence of actions with a scheduler σ is defined by the following induction: the empty sequence is compatible with σ, and αa is compatible with σ iff α is compatible with σ and dom(a) ∈ σ(α), where α ∈ A * and a ∈ A. An infinite action sequence is compatible with a scheduler σ if all its finite prefixes are compatible with σ. A run r of a machine is defined to be compatible with a scheduler σ if Act(r) is compatible with σ. Given a machine M , we write R(M, σ) for the set of all runs of M compatible with σ.
We henceforth assume that schedulers do not terminate, so that if α is compatible with σ,
Write Υ for the set of schedulers and Υ d for the set of deterministic schedulers. A schedule is a finite or infinite sequence sch
. If r is a run we also write sch(r) for sch(Act(r)).
In order to prevent the scheduler being a channel for information flow, we define a notion that captures that the decisions of the scheduler are independent of the actions of an agent. For the definition, we need an operation on actions that masks actions of agent u:
Intuitively, this says that scheduling decisions do not depend on the actions performed by agent u. We may therefore view a u-oblivious scheduler σ as a function from (µ u (A)) 
and there is a yield in the last |α| mod k actions in α, 
−→ t and dom(a)
is the unique domain that has its actions enabled at q. Now say A represents σ if for all α ∈ A * compatible with σ, we have σ(α) = σ A (α). Interestingly, a scheduler SOLTS representing a u-oblivious scheduler is not necessarily u-oblivious. Therefore, we restrict to the u-oblivious scheduler SOLTSs representing σ when dealing with a u-oblivious scheduler σ. We justify the existence of such u-oblivious implementations as follows.
Definition 4.2 For all u-oblivious scheduler σ, define the (infinite state) characteristic scheduler SOLTS
It can be readily shown that A σ represents σ. Since µ u (a) = ⊥ u for all a ∈ A u , it is also clear that A σ is uoblivious. If we drop the condition that σ be u-oblivious we can give a similar definition by removing all occurrences of the operator µ u . This yields the following result, in which we also note that the set of runs of a SOLTS compatible with a scheduler can be understood as being obtained via parallel composition with a scheduler SOLTS representing the scheduler: 
We will be interested in definitions of security that classify a machine M as secure or insecure when it is scheduled according to a scheduler σ. We assume agents have a synchronous view of the machine, making an observation at each moment of time and being aware of clock ticks. We permit that the agents are aware of the scheduler being used, but may not have complete information concerning the schedule in a particular run.
As already mentioned, we confine ourselves to the policy L ≤ H, which permits information to flow from L to H but not vice-versa. To prevent the scheduler providing a channel for the prohibited information flow, we need to ensure that the schedules obtained, which may be observable to L, do not provide information to L about H's activity. To this end, we focus on H-oblivious schedulers, in which schedules do not carry any information about H actions. Now, as implemented, the compound machine will have the form M A where A is some scheduler SOLTS representing σ, so on first principles, we should define security as a predicate on these composite systems. This raises a concern: is the security of the scheduled machine sensitive to the choice of implementation A? Intuitively, this should not be the case: the role of the scheduler is only to enable and disable agent activity, and its internal state is made invisible to the agents H and L, so what matters is the set of possible schedules, not the implementation details of how these schedules are generated. We say that a security property X is implementation independent if for all H-oblivious schedulers σ and all H-oblivious scheduler SOLTS A 1 , A 2 representing σ, the machine M A 1 satisfies X iff M A 2 satisfies X. We seek properties for which this is the case. In this case, we may view X as a set of pairs (M, σ), where M is a machine and σ is a scheduler. Given such a set, if Σ ⊆ Υ is a set of schedulers, we write X(Σ) for the set of machines M such that (M, σ) ∈ X for all σ ∈ Σ. (When Σ = {σ}, we write simply X(σ).) This gives a notion that is of independent interest: if M ∈ X(Σ), we are guaranteed that M is secure according to definition X whatever scheduler in Σ is selected. This gives flexibility in the choice of a scheduler for the system, which is desirable for systems that need to be deployed into diverse settings.
Trace-based Security Definitions
In this section, we present a number of definitions of security that adapt some notions of security from the literature on asynchronous systems. The common feature of these definitions is that they can be defined using a trace-based semantics of machines.
A Trace Set Semantics
All of the trace-based definitions we give can be stated with respect to a weaker notion of semantics than SOLTS, in a way that easily leads to the property of scheduler independence. To clarify this, we define the notion of system, which is a tuple I = (R, {view u } u∈D ) consisting of a set R and functions view u : R → V where V is some set. Intuitively, R represents the set of possible states of the world, and view u (r) for r ∈ R represents the information u has about r. We say β is a possible view for u ∈ D in I if there exists r ∈ R with view u (r) = β.
Systems can be generated both from SOLTS and from pairs consisting of a SOLTS and a scheduler. In particular, given a SOLTS M , we define the system
* are inductively defined by view u (s 0 ) = obs u (s 0 ), and
where α ∈ R(M ) and A u + = A u ∪ { }. Intuitively, this says that an agent's view of a run is the log of all its observations as well as its own actions in the run, with " " where an action not from u is performed. For a pair (M, σ), the definition is given similarly by
, with the identical definition of the view functions except that the domain is now R(M, σ).
Proposition 5.1 If scheduler SOLTS A represents the scheduler σ and M is a machine, then I(M A) = I(M, σ).
All of the trace based security definitions we give can be stated as properties X of a system I. By Proposition 5.1, if scheduler SOLTS A 1 and A 2 both represent a scheduler σ, then I(M A 1 ) = I(M A 2 ). This leads immediately to the implementation-independence of the definitions with respect to the schedulers.
The scheduling of an agent's own actions is visible in its view, but this may leave the agent uncertain as to the scheduling of the other agents. Say that agent u is scheduleaware in (M, σ) if for all runs r, r ∈ R(M, σ) with view u (r) = view u (r ) we have sch(r) = sch(r ). In particular, every agent is schedule-aware in (M, σ) with deterministic σ.
Nondeducibility On Inputs
For asynchronous systems, the notion of nondeducibility on inputs [26] states that a system is secure if L cannot deduce from its view any information about the sequence of H actions that have been performed. We would like to formulate a similar definition for systems that are subject to a scheduler. There are a number of subtleties that lead us to state several different definitions.
One difference in the synchronous case is that, using its knowledge of the scheduler, L can make deductions about the number of H actions that may have been performed. It may also be able to deduce when these actions occurred. The following definition abstracts from these concerns by focussing on the possible infinite sequences of H actions that are consistent with L's information.
Intuitively, this definition says that L is never able to rule out α as the sequence of actions that will be performed by H over time. This definition does not take into account the fact that L may be able to determine from its view some constraints on the number of H actions that have been performed in the run. Plainly, the number of H actions cannot be more than the number of observations in the view. However, knowledge of the scheduler may enable L to further restrict this set of possibilities, or even to determine the exact number of H actions. Given a possible view β of I(M, σ), define the set of possible numbers of H actions Pna H (M, σ, β) to be the set of numbers n such that there exists r ∈ R(M, σ) with view L (r) = β and |Act H (r)| = n. The intuition for the next definition is that the possible numbers of H actions should be all that L knows about the H actions. The following result gives some relationships between these definitions. • If the H input sequence is of the form hh . . . or hh . . ., schedules of the form HSys(H + L) ω make it consistent with all the above L views.
• 2. To show tNDI 2 ⊆ tNDI 3 , we give a system which is in tNDI 2 but not in tNDI 3 . Let σ be a scheduler that produces schedules of the form (HSys 
Nondeducibility on Strategies
Nondeducibility on inputs represents an attack model in which it is assumed that L is the attacker and H is a trusted agent that may engage in any of its possible behaviours. A stronger attack model is to consider situations where H may be a Trojan horse or insider that is attempting to pass information to L. By engaging in specific behaviour, known to L, it may be possible for the insider to pass information to L. Wittbold and Johnson [30] showed by example that nondeducibility on inputs is too weak for this type of attack, and proposed an alternative definition called nondeducibility on strategies. In asynchronous systems, nondeducibility on strategies turns out to be equivalent to nondeducibility on inputs [6, 27] (r i−1 ) ) for all i. Write R(M, σ, π) for the set of runs in R(M, σ) that are consistent with π.
Definition 5.6 (M, σ) ∈ tNDS 1 if for every r ∈ R(M, σ) and H strategy π, there exists
As above, it is also of interest to consider the security of a system when L may learn the schedule producing a particular run. This leads to the following stronger definition.
Definition 5.7 (M, σ) ∈ tNDS 2 if for all r ∈ R(M, σ) and H strategy π, there exists r ∈ R(M, σ, π) such that view L (r) = view L (r ) and sch(r) = sch(r ).
The following result gives some relationships between these notions and those of the previous section.
3. tNDS 1 ⊂ tNDI 1 and tNDS 2 ⊂ tNDI 3 .
The containment tNDS 2 (σ) ⊂ tNDI 3 (σ) is strict even on deterministic schedulers. Consider the example in Fig. 4 with Any L observation is compatible with any H strategy, because the schedules SysSys(H + L) ω produce all possible L views independent of any action by H. However, the system is not in tNDI 3 because if L learns that the schedule is among HSys(H + L) ω , it can determine from the view 0 0 0 that the first H action was h. Moreover, it is not in tNDI 2 because there does not exist a run r with view L (r) = 0 0 0 and Act H (r) = h , although |h | ∈ Pna H (M, σ, 0 0 0). Together with the witness of Fig. 4 which is a machine in tNDI 2 (σ) but not in tNDS 1 (σ), we have the following result.
Proposition 5.9 tNDS 1 ⊆ tNDI 2 and tNDI 2 ⊆ tNDS 1 .
Revisiting the Motivating Example
We formulate the motivating example by the following. Define the signature (A, D, dom) 
Here m u denotes that u is trying to push some data into the buffer, and u denotes u is skipping. Based on the signature, we present the system as a tuple M = S, {s 0 }, →, O, obs , where
• →⊆ S × A × S is the transition relation.
The first component b of the state (b, f ) is a buffer state, where is the empty buffer; the second component f is used to express output values returned by user operations. Only agent H can observe the buffer state. The transition relation contains the following transition types:
where u ∈ {H, L} clears the buffer of S ys data,
where S ys clears the buffer and transmits the data.
• System-possess:
, where system occupies the buffer when neither H nor L is using it.
• System-release:
where S ys releases the buffer nondeterministically.
Here u denotes L when u = H, and denotes H when u = L. The following cases illustrate how this system behaves with respect to the security properties we have proposed so far.
For the schedule σ = HLS ys..., the system (M, σ)
can easily be seen to be not in tNDI 1 , hence not secure for any of the security properties we have discussed.
For the schedule σ = (HS ysS ysLS ysS ys)
ω it is also not in tNDI 1 , since the view ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥m L ack is not consistent with H having performed m H at its turn.
For the schedule σ = (HS ysS ysS ysLS ys)
ω , the system (M, σ) is in tNDS 2 (and also tNDS 1 ). If L uses its turn to send a message, the buffer will be empty by the following H turn. Thus, at H's turn, the buffer can only be in states or τ . In either case, it can be checked that whether or not H then does m H or H , by the time of L's next turn the buffer could be in either state or τ . Thus, L learns nothing about either the buffer state at the time H acted, nor the action that H performed.
If σ = (LSys(H + Sys)Sys)
ω , then (M, σ) is in tNDS 1 but not in tNDI 2 . To see that it is not in tNDI 2 , note that the L view ⊥m L ack ⊥ ⊥ ⊥m L ack is consistent with H having performed the single action m H , but not consistent with it having performed H . However, this system is in tNDS 1 since H can be skipped for arbitrarily long periods of time and S ys alone can produce all possible L views without H's participation.
Bisimulation-based Definitions
Restrictiveness (RES) is a security property introduced by McCullough [14] . In state-observed systems, it can be characterised by the existence of an unwinding relation, which is a binary relation ≈ on the set of reachable system states [28] . In asynchronous systems, the unwinding relation is essentially a bisimulation relation treating L's inputs as external actions, with H actions not causing changes distinguishable by L. The conditions are as follows:
Intuitively, LR a says that H actions do not cause changes distinguishable by L. We would like to formulate a similar notion in scheduled systems. Since we allow that L is aware that an H action has been scheduled, the condition LR a is too strong. We reformulate the definition so as to permit L to distinguish that H (or Sys) has performed an action, but masks which action has been performed. We have two different variants of LR a , corresponding to the assumptions that L may or may not know the schedule. One major difference between RES and NDI/NDS is that the definition of RES requires an explicit representation of states and transitions, which is more discriminative than the notion of sets of runs required for NDI/NDS. In order to formulate a version of RES for a scheduled system (M, σ) we need to apply the notion of unwinding relation to the SOLTS (M A) where A represents σ. An apparent problem is that whereas unwinding is sensitive to bisimilarity, different scheduler SOLTS representing the scheduler σ need not be bisimilar. Figure 6 . Insensitive unwinding is implementation dependent Fig. 6 is an example which shows that there exists a machine M and a scheduler σ such that for different implementations of σ, the composed system may have different results with respect to the existence of an insensitive synchronous unwinding relation. The two scheduler SOLTS above give the schedules H(H + Sys)(H + L) ω , (we omit the states with heights greater than 2 since the first two steps suffice for our purpose) with each state labelled by the name of the scheduled domain. The states of the machine are labelled by L observations. One may easily observe that there is an insensitive synchronous unwinding relation on M A 1 , in particular we have q 1 ) ; however, there is no insensitive synchronous unwinding relation on M A 2 .
Definition 6.1 Given a SOLTS
A more complicated example showing that sensitive synchronous unwinding is also implementation dependent has been constructed in Fig. 7 . Here the two scheduler SOLTSs A 1 , A 2 give the schedules HLL(HH + LL) (LH) ω , and one may observe there is a sensitive synchronous unwinding relation on M A 1 , but there is no sensitive synchronous
h,h'
Figure 7. Sensitive unwinding is implementation dependent
The dependence on scheduler implementation suggests that in order to obtain an implementation-independent, bisimulation-based definition of security, we should quantify over scheduler implementations. We could do this either by a universal or by an existential quantification over scheduler implementations. Which is preferred depends on one's attitude to bisimulation based definitions of security. One attitude is that the property most of interest is given by a trace-based definition, but bisimulation-based definitions provide a useful proof technique. In this case, an existential quantification is appropriate. On the other hand, if one adheres to an understanding in which existence of an unwinding is what makes a system secure, then it is necessary to quantify universally over scheduler implementations in order to obtain an implementation-independent notion of security. We define both variants: The properties tRES Q i (for Q = ∀, ∃) are the strongest of the security properties we have discussed so far, with the following relations holding. Fig. 8 where A H = {h, h }, A L = {l}, and the deterministic scheduler σ contains the schedule (HL) ω . If "≈" were a (in)sensitive synchronous unwinding, we would have that the states at level 2 are related by "≈". However, these states are not bisimilar, as they do not satisfy the LR H (LR) property if we relate any two of them. We may also observe there is no H strategy to pass information to L regardless of H and L's observational power. 
Scheduler-Independent Properties
All the previous properties are about security with respect to a particular scheduler. As already noted above, it is also of interest to consider security with respect to sets of schedulers, since this gives flexibility to configure the system. Let Υ HO be the set of schedulers that are H-oblivious. We show that for trace based properties, in order to prove a system is secure for all schedulers in Υ HO , it suffices to show it is secure for all deterministic schedulers.
Intuitively, given a system controlled by a nondeterministic scheduler, if there is an evidence that the system is insecure, then that evidence can also be produced by a finite deterministic fragment of that scheduler. As a consequence, we obtain the following:
Since L is schedule-aware with respect to a deterministic scheduler, by Lemma 5.5(2) and Lemma 5.8(2), we obtain:
To show that tNDS i (Υ HO ) for i ∈ {1, 2} is strictly stronger than tNDI j (Υ HO ) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} we refer to Fig. 4 which is a machine in tNDI 3 (σ) for all deterministic σ but obviously not in tNDS 1 (Υ HO ). For restrictiveness, the existence of an (in)sensitive unwinding relation on M itself is sufficient to show the existence of an (in)sensitive unwinding relations on M A for all H-oblivious scheduler implementations. 
Related Work
Our focus has been on the interaction of schedulers with notions of information flow security. There appears to be relatively little literature on this topic. Rushby's separability. One related set of papers is Rushby's work on separability [16, 18] , which aims to define a security property for operating systems security kernels. A separation kernel provides each user the abstraction of a local abstract machine, which is unaffected by the behaviour of other users. Rushby's definitions assume that agent's views are defined in an asynchronous fashion, but his machine model is based on a notion of "colours" that amounts to scheduling of the processes. The information flow policy for separability is stronger than that we have considered (since it prohibits information flow in both directions). It would be interesting to revisit his work in the light of our results in this paper. Language based approaches. Language based information flow analysis is pioneered by Denning [5] and then followed by a large body of literature which has been surveyed in [21] (up to year 2003). However, most of this work focused on storage channels instead of timing channels (for the classification of covert channels we refer to [11] ). Agat [1] is the first to propose a bisimulation based definition of information flow that takes into account time spent on program execution in terms of the number of executable instructions. He proposes to close the timing channel by padding programs with dummy computations, which is automated using a type based mechanism. On the topic of scheduling, Volpano et al. [29] studied probabilistic information flow of multi-process programs in the presence of a uniform scheduler. Another work in which schedulers are explicitly considered is that of Sabelfeld et al. [22] , who present an elegant formulation of language based security properties with dynamic thread handling by schedulers, with a probabilistic bisimulation-based definition of security. Their schedulers make decisions either deterministically or probabilistically, but they consider only a single input and output, and treat timing as unobservable to Low (but observable to the scheduler). Their definition of security is independent of all schedulers, compared with our focus on independence on implementation for a known scheduler. Russo et al, in a sequence of papers (a recent one is [19] ) have studied a similar setting for non-probabilistic bisimulation-based definitions of security. Their scheduler is also defined in a programming language syntax so that the interaction between threads and the scheduler is made explicit. Their noninterferent schedulers also rely on bisimulation-based relation, which is comparable to our definition of oblivious schedulers to prevent a scheduler from becoming an information channel.
Boudol and Castelleni [4] applied a type system to rule out illegal flow in both sequential and concurrent settings with scheduling (another similar but independent work is [25] ). They ensure while loops guarded by High variables are not followed by Low assignments, so that termination of that loop will not be detectable by observing the result of the subsequent Low assignment. An extended and mechanized version is in [2] . A follow up work [12] of Boudol et al. discusses noninterference for a class of synchronous programs called reactive programs which incorporates features such as broadcasting, suspension and preemption. They have two different ways of parallel compositions -a global asynchronous composition and a local synchronous composition with a deterministic cooperative scheduling discipline, and a new type of illegal flow called suspension leak is identified. Their security properties are all bisimulation-based and time-insensitive.
Compared with language based approaches on information flow with scheduling, our work proceeds on a different level, in which we define both system and scheduler in a language of automata with discrete-timed transitions. Therefore, our definitions do not naturally come with type systems. Another limit of our work is that it does not support dynamic process creation or dynamic policies, due to our static approach to system modeling. We focus on both trace-based and bisimulation-based definitions, in a time-sensitive way. Our model does not contain probability which is a different aspect from nondeterminism (their relationship has been well explained in [23] ). Further research could be done by extending our automata model to a synchronous version of probabilistic automata [24] with observations. Process algebra. A number of recent works from the process algebra community also considered synchronous notions of process. Focardi et al. extended the asynchronous definitions of security of [6] from the CCS-like setting of the process algebra SPA into a timed version in the framework called tSPA, based on a discrete timed weak bisimulation [7] . They consider bisimulation based definitions of security that are based on NDS-like intuitions. In [9] , Huang et al. restated a set of failure-divergence based and low determinism based definitions [15] in a version of timed CSP. The underlying model of timed CCS and timed CSP seems to be more general than ours, in the sense that every SOLTS can be cast into a timed LTS with every action followed by a single tick. However, the SOLTS model is technically more suitable to express the effect of a system being controlled by a scheduler, via a lock-step synchronization with a scheduler SOLTS. Refinement Paradox.
Since we deal with nondeterministic systems, the interpretation of our definitions needs to take into account the refinement paradox of [10] , which says information flow security is not necessarily preserved by refinement of a system. Whether this is a problem depends on the role that nondeterminism plays in the system model -in case of underspecification, the refinement paradox becomes a concern, whereas if the nondeterministic behaviour is inherent in the system and is not under the control of any agent (e.g., represents deliberate randomization), then refinement is not an issue. We note that our definitions address refinement concerns in a number of ways: first, we have allowed nondeterminism in the scheduler, but have stated definitions such as tNDI 3 and tNDS 2 that require system security for all deterministic refinements of a given nondeterministic scheduler -such definitions are clearly preserved under refinement of the nondeterminism in the scheduler. Second, the strategic definitions we have stated: tNDS 1 and tNDS 2 , are preserved under refinement of H behaviour. However, all our definitions retain the inherent nondeterminism in the system itself, so may not be preserved under refinement of this source of nondeterminism.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we introduced a class of security properties on a synchronous state machine model with a discrete-time semantics and a definition of scheduler. The security properties extend nondeducibility [26] , nondeducibility on inputs [30] and restrictiveness [14] in a synchronous setting with scheduling. Independence of scheduler implementation also has been discussed for these security properties. We intend to conduct a more detailed technical comparison between the security properties in the literature and our definitions in future work. We also intend to study the complexity of verifying these notions of security.
